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ANTHONY JS. REID 
The eveP-ts which brought the Indonesian struggle for independence to 
fulfillment can be viewed in two lights. They constituted a struggle be-
tween European colonialism and Asian nationalism fought out on the 
battlefield, at the negotiating table, and in the hearts of men. But they 
also constituted the climax of a revolution, such as France had experi-
enced after 1879, Russia after 1917, or Vietnam in step with Indonesia 
from 1945. Once a revolution breaks the domination of the past it 
tends to move steadily further to the left as it seeks a new source of le-
gitimacy and legality in something mysteriously known as the sover-
eignty of the people (kedaulatan rakyat). Each setback suffered by the 
leadership tends to produce new leaders better in touch with the radical 
demands from below, until at last one group is able to suppress its ri-
vals and establish a new equilibrium in the name of the people. 
The Indonesian revolution is crucial in both respects. It showed for 
the first time that a determined European colonial power could be 
forced out of Asia by a mixture of military and diplomatic pressure. It 
also created, through revolution, a new political system. The definition 
of that system continued to move to the left until 1948, when it shifted 
sharply back to the center. 
The Dutch attack of 20 July 1947 on the areas surrounding their 
seven urban enclaves in Java and Sumatra failed completely to overturn 
the republican government as Van Mook had hoped it would. All it did 
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was bite off the most lucrative parts of republican territory-the plan-
tation areas of West Java and East Sumatra and the oil installations near 
Palembang-as well as the areas adjacent to Surabaya, Semarang, and 
Padang. Economically this strengthened the Dutch and weakened the 
republic, but economic pressure seldom stops a revolution. If anything, 
the growing hardship in the remaining republican-held areas of Java 
and Sumatra, overcrowded with refugees, lacking resources, and 
blockaded from external trade, increased radical demands for total 
popular resistance against the Dutch. Moreover the outbreak of open 
warfare between Dutch and Indonesians shocked a war-weary world, 
which would henceforth insist through the newborn United Nations 
that the conflict must not be resolved by force. 
- Every republican government was obliged to try to retain interna-
tional sympathy by meeting the Dutch halfway in negotiations, even 
though this compromised the popular demand for 100% merdeka. The 
United Nations-inspired negotiations which led to the Renville Agree-
ment of January 1948 were particularly painful, since the republic had 
to acknowledge de facto the seizure of territory in the Dutch aggres-
sion of 1947. Even though the concession was essential, the prime 
minister who made it had to pay the price for it in popularity, just as 
Syahrir had had to for earlier concessions. 
This prime minister was Amir Syarifuddin, who tried to be at once a 
Marxist and a Christian, a democrat and a communist, a nationalist 
and an internationalist. He led the most leftist government Indonesia 
has ever had, with 10 of the 34 ministers, including Amir himself, later 
declaring themselves to have been communists. Renville provided an 
opportunity for PNI and Masyumi to withdraw their support for him 
as premier, and for Sukarno then to name Hatta to form a "Presiden-
tial" Cabinet with no Marxist representatives, no longer responsible 
like previous cabinets to the KNIP (Parliament) where the Sayap Kiri 
(Left Wing) was dominant. The parties of the Sayap Kiri thereby lost 
their leadership of the revolution, including the key ministries of de-
fense and interior, which they had hitherto controlled. In this major 
turning point it was Amir the Marxist who appeared the naive believer 
in parliamentary legality, outmaneuvred by the realpolitik of Sukarno 
1 and Hatta. 
The Marxist parties, now calling themselves Front Demokrasi 
Rakyat, or Peoples' Democratic Front (FDR), tried to make up in pop-
ular support what they had lost in power, by developing a more radical 
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economic and social program than the revolution had yet seen. They 
now opposed any compromise with the Dutch, encouraged strikes for 
~etter_ co~ditions, notably at Delanggu and Cepu, and pressed for na-
t10nahza~10n of en~erprises a~d distribution of land, especially bengkok 
Oand assigned to village officials), to the landless. Meanwhile the army . . 
1 
was also becoming polarized between supporters and opponents of the 1 
government's plans to demobilize unruly and poorly-armed units es-
pecially those sympathetic to the opposition. Internal conflict bet~een 
Left and Right, and between rival military units, was accentuated when 
the FDR leaders, demoralized by their loss of power, accepted the radi-
cal policy which Musso brought from Moscow in August 1948. The 
1
., 
FDR parties merged into a larger and more aggressive PKI. 
In Yogyakarta and Solo th~ powerful Si,liwangi Division gave the 
government a stronger position, bl1! .~!.1 the Mac:iiun area Pesindo forces 
of t~~ L~ft were_ stronger. When the PKI acted first to strengthen its 
position m Madmn, local conflicts erupted into a savage civil war. In 
successfully crushing this so-called Madiun Rebellion of September 
1948, 5]!~ republican government achieved three important _,~ims: it 
eliminated the rival leadership, ending the mo~~m~nt of the revolution 
~o the left; it _created the beginnings of unity in the army (TNI), at least 
m Java; and it demonstrated to the United States, the key force in the 
United Nations, that moderate nationalists (rather than colonialists) 
were the best guarantee against communism. 
The reputation of the republican government in the United States 
was therefore highest when it was most needed: 19 December 1948, at 
the moment of the second Police Action. Dutch paratroops attacked all 
the remaining republican cities, capturing Sukarno, Hatta, and most of 
the cabinet in Yogyakarta. Once again, this Dutch aggression arose out 
of d~spair with other methods of defeating the republic, and ended up 
h~rtmg the Dutch much more than the republic. The attack was a clear 
challenge to the authority of the Uruted' Nations. The United States 
immediately suspended Marshall Plan aid to Holland. Moreover Indo-
nesians of various kinds-Left and Right, ~epublicans and federalists, 
military and civilian- could unite against this out~age. The cabinets of 
Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT) and Pasundan, the two largest of the 
Dutch-created federal states, resigned in protest at the Dutch action. 
The so-called zaman gerilya (guerrilla period) ,las.ted until 6 July 1949, 
when the Dutch admitted the failure of their military venture by ~~~ 
storing the imprisoned republican leaders to power in Yogyakarta. In 
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this period republican forces discovered that the Dutch superiority in 
weaponry and training was no longer effective, since guerrillas could 
attack them from rural bases almost anywhere. For the military this 
period also became a model for military-civilian-relations. With the 
le;ding civilians in Dutch hands, the army led the popular resistance, 
receiving warm support from villagers in the form of food and hospi-
tality. 
Many guerrilla fighters did not find it easy to accept that after ~.July 
1949-leiiaership passed back to civilians and the struggle moved to the 
conference t<tble. To stop the revolution would be even harder than to 
start it. In many parts of Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi guerrilla units 
refused to disarm, claiming that the cause for which they fought had 
not yet been realized. Calling themselves Darul Islam, some of them 
continued their struggle for another fifteen years. 
Even if the revolution had not quite achieved unity by 1950, it had 
exalted the ideal of unity as a sacred goal. Paradoxically it was the 
Dutch, who had governed the Netherlands East Indies as a centralized 
state, who tried to use a very decentralized federal system as the basis 
for retaining influence in post war Indonesia. In each of the areas they 
controlled after the 194 7 military action the Dutch fostered autono-
mous negara with their own cabinets and representative assemblies at-
tempting to represent all ethnic interests. In practice, however, these 
structures were held together by the steel frame of the colonial army 
and bureaucracy. By contrast, what united the republic was not struc-
tures but ideals. Especially at the beginning of the revolution, Yogy-
akarta had hardly any means to control the spontaneous movements 
for Indonesia merdeka all over the archipelago. Yet even the unruly pe-
juang (fighters) of Sumatra, Sulawesi, Banten, or Surakarta agreed that 
the ideal of unity must be defended against the divisiveness of Dutch-
inspired federalism. 
The compromise negotiated at the Round Table Conference in The 
Hague between August and November 1949 was for the independent 
federal Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat) already foreshadowed at 
Linggajati. But for many this was only acceptable as a stepping stone to 
the unitary republic proclaimed in 1945. Once sovereignty was trans-
ferred by the Dutch on 1 January 1950, the federal states one by one 
began to merge into the Yogyakarta republic. 
On 17 August 19 50 Indonesia became in fact the unitary indepen-
dent republic which had been proclaimed five years earlier, and 
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dreamed about for half a century. The sense of common identity 
forged in that revolutionary struggle had been extraordinary. If we 
compare the subsequent history of Indonesia with that of India or In-
dochina it becomes clear what a remarkable achievement in five short 
years that sense of unity was. The thousands of islands, dozens of eth-
nic groups and languages, several major religions and ideologies of In-
donesia would henceforth be united in a bond that was sealed not only 
by words and institutions, but by common sacrifice. Satu tanah air, satu 
bangsa, satu bahasa. 
